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PICKETING A STORE-INJuNCTION.-In the November
(1903) number of THE AMERICAN LAW REGISTER there ap-
peared an article upon the case of Foster v. Retail Clerks' Inter-
national Protective Association (78 N. Y. Suppl. 86o, 19o2).
This outlined the position of the New York Supreme Court in
holding that mere picketing, if it is peaceful and without threat
or intimidation, cannot be regarded in any sense as unlawful.
It seemed to be taken as a matter of course that to intimidate
and threaten should be enjoined, and accordingly an order was
issued to restrain the defendants from "the use of threats,
violence, or intimidation with the intent of preventing customers
from entering the store of the plaintiffs." Whatever may be the
difference of opinion as to the lawfulness of peaceful persuasion
not to trade, the authorities seem to agree that the "use of
force, or threat, or menace of harm to persons or property" is
not to be tolerated, and that the courts should issue injunctions
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to prevent it. There can hardly be much dispute as to when
ordinary physical force or violence is used in a strike; the diffi-
culty in the picketing cases arises when this is not present. It is
hard to determine just what constitutes intimidation, and to
distinguish where advice and peaceful persuasion become a
threat.
It has been held that all picketing is a threat, that the word is
borrowed from the vocabulary of war and taken appropriately,
and that the only way in which picketing could be effective
would be to produce in the minds of the non-union.men a feel-
ing of fear. (Otis Steel Co. v. Local Union, iio Fed. 698,
19Ol.) This position has been assailed again and again and
injunctions have been refused because the picketing was
not accompanied by any intimidation. (Kerbs v. Rosenstein,
67 N. Y. Suppl. 385, 1900; Standard Tube v. International
Union, 9 Ohio Dec. 692, 1899.) At the other extremity of the
positions possible to take upon this subject is the argument of
counsel that picketing is legal if it stops short of actual physical
violence. This, Mr. Justice Mitchell says, is a most serious mis-
conception (O'Neil v. Behanna, 182 Pa. 243, 1897), and the
issuing of the injunctions in most of the cases that I shall quote
refutes it.
Calling workmen " scabs" and "blacklegs" is frequently one
of the circumstances that warrant an injunction, and in O'Neil
v. Behanna it was held to amount to more than mere argument
and persuasion and the legitimate conduct of a strike. In
Murdock Kerr v. Walker (152 Pa. 595, 1893) these words
were avowed to be part of a system .intended to make the men
"sick and tired" of working, and the injunction was framed
to include "opprobrious epithets." In Wick China v. Brown
(164 Pa. 449, 1894) to hold up employees to the ridicule and
contempt of bystanders was forbidden. A banner displayed in
front of a factory requesting workmen to keep away was held
by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (Sherry v.
Perkins, 147 Mass. 213, 1888) to be, not a libel, but a means of
threat and intimidation to prevent persons from entering the
employment of the plaintiffs.
But more difficult than these cases of threats clearly uttered
are those where the men say nothing, or use phrases that may be
interpreted as a threat or not. When strikers are" well re-
strained and disciplined they usually are most ingenious in
keeping to the letter of the law, but, to quote Judge Hammond
(Amer. Steel Wire v. Drawers, 90 Fed. 6o8, 1898), "they
exert the most potent and unlawful force or violence without
lifting a finger against any man, or uttering a word of threat
against himr" This usually is accomplished by assembling the
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strikers to meet those who remain at work, ostensibly to appeal
to them and to persuade them to leave it.
During one of the coal strikes in West Virginia a company
of about two hundred men went into camp a mile from the mine
openings. Every morning they would march along the road near
the company's property, but not on it, and then countermarch
through the village, all the time in a sober and decent manner.
The court held that this was neither an aid to fair argument nor
conducive to the state of mind that makes willing converts, and
that it did intimidate a number of miners. Accordingly, the
defendants were put to jail for violating an injunction against
threats, menaces, and any character of intimidation (Mackall v.
Ratchford, 82 Fed. 41, 1897).
An exhibition of force has been made by keeping always
near the shops large bodies of men, massed and controlled by
leaders (Amer. Steel Wire v. Drawers); by filling a train-
yard with a surging crowd of strikers in a fever heat of excite-
ment, although no actual violence was done (U. S. v. Kane,
23 Fed. 750, 1885) ; by parading a group of men up and down
in front of a boycotted saloon, each man dressed in ragged
clothing, having labels pasted on him and distributing circulars
displaying the word "Boycott" (People v. Wilsig, 4 N. Y.
Crim. Rep. 403, 1886); and by " creating an unfriendly atmos-
phere everywhere" (O'Neil v. Behanna).
The very fact that 'there is a large crowd of men seems to
constitute a threat, and to convert persuasion into intimidation.
Indeed, said Judge Mitchell in this last case, "the arguments
and persuasion and appeals of a hostile and demonstrative mob
have a potency over men of ordinary nerve which far exceeds
the limits of lawfulness. This display of force, although none
actually is used, is intimidation and as unlawful as violence
itself."
Whether an act is intimidation or not must be found from its
effect and the purpose with which it is done; the test to be
applied is whether an ordinary man would be intimidated.
That a company went to great expense to board and lodge its
employees in its own mill-yards, and provided guards for those
who went daily to their homes has been regarded as good evi-
dence that the strikers were guilty of intimidation, for other-
wise the company would not have taken these precautions nor
their men have submitted to them. (Otis Steel Co. v. Local
Union.)
The character of the picketing and the purpose of the strikers
is not to be judged only from their professions. A request may
be the most effective threat and kindly advice sardonic. The
court must look at things as they really are, and construe
actions and words according to all the circumstances surround-
NOTES.
ing. (People v. Kostka, 4 N. Y. Crim. Rep. 434, 1886.) In re
Wabash R. R. Co. (24 Fed. 217, 1885) was a case where the
bosses received a notice "requesting" them to keep away from
the shops, and saying that thereby they would "command the
protection" of the strikers, "but in no case are you to cbnsider
this intimidation." The court held that this implied threat
would justify placing the perpetrators under peace bonds and
it found them guilty of contempt. In U. S. v. Kane (23 Fed.
750, 1885) Judge Brewer puts the case of a man discharged,
who, securing a number of armed friends and coming around
to one who had refused to leave in sympathy, says, "I request
you to leave." "This is nothing," said the Judge, "but a
simple request-that is, so far as the language which is used;
there is no threat. . . . Now the common-sense of every man
tells him that while the language used may be very polite and
be merely in the form of a request, yet it is accompanied with
that backing of force intended as a demonstration . . . and
the man leaves really because he is intimidated."
The rule of what shall constitute a threat or menace in these
cases seems to be this: If the acts or the words, whatever the
pretence, do as a matter of fact amount to intimidation, then
they are to be taken as such, and the picketing should be
enjoined.
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